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The end of the Cold War triggered the spread of multiparty politics across the global south 
and the former Soviet Union. The western democracies argued this form of governance 
would ensure the rule of law, human rights and constitutionalism. However, in the recent 
past a worrisome trend has emerged where these global powers support opposition 
leaders in order to oust legitimate but antagonistic elected leaders in foreign. More 
often than not, this political change is engineered in wanton disregard of the country’s 
constitution and the relevant provisions of international law. This geopolitical conundrum 
is portrayed by the purported ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine in 2014 
and most recently President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Despite being the duly elected 
leaders of their respective countries, they were illegitimately ousted opposition leaders 
supported by western powers. In the same vein, these political changes usually initiated 
using force contrary to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other 
relevant principles of international law. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has established a concrete body of jurisprudence on this subject matter though the 
same is yet to be codified in international law. Broadly speaking, this paper argues this 
practice is unequivocally illegal and equivalent to infringement upon the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of these countries.
Keywords: democracy; foreign intervention; international law; Ukraine; Venezuela.
Recommended citation: Joseph Lutta, A Critical Analysis of Western Intervention in 
Foreign Nations: A Case Study of Ukraine and Venezuela, 7(4) russian Law Journal 30–72 
(2019).
JOSEPH LUTTA 31
Table of Contents
General Background
1. Introduction
1.1. International Legal Instruments
1.1.1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
1.1.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
1.1.3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural  
Rights (ICESCR)
1.1.4. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning  
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance  
with the Charter of the United Nations
1.1.5. General Assembly Resolution of Declaration on the Inadmissibility  
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection  
of their Independence and Sovereignty
1.1.6. Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources  
in International Law
1.1.7. The Applicability of Vicarious Liability in Public International Law
2. Jurisprudence on Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
2.1. Nicaragua v. USA (Case Concerning the Military  
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua)
2.2. USA v. Iran (Case Concerning United States Diplomatic  
and Consular Staff in Tehran)
2.3. Iran v. USA (Case Concerning Oil Platforms)
2.4. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat  
or Use of Nuclear Weapons
2.5. Yugoslavia v. NATO (Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force  
in International Law)
2.6. Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences  
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
2.7. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda  
(Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo)
3. Democracy in Ukraine and Venezuela
3.1. Democracy in Ukraine
3.1.1. History of Ukraine
3.1.2. Post-Soviet Era from 1992–2004
3.1.3. The Era Orange Revolution and the Reign of Viktor Yushchenko
3.1.4. Ukraine, Russia and the European Union Under the Reign  
of Viktor Yanukovych
3.1.5. Ukraine, Russia and NATO
3.1.6. Legal Issues Surrounding the Ouster of Viktor Yanukovych
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VII (2019) Issue 4 32
3.1.6.1. the unconstitutionality of the Ousting of President yanukovych
3.1.6.2. illegality of the Ousting of President yanukovych from Office
3.2. Venezuela
3.2.1. Background Study
3.2.2. The Rise of Hugo Chávez and Bolivarianism
3.2.3. The Reign of Nicolás Maduro Regime
3.2.4. Neoconservatism
3.2.5. Enter President Donald Trump a Political Dark Horse  
or Trojan Horse for Neoconservatism?
3.2.6. Determining the Legitimacy of the Juan Guaidó Regime Change
3.2.7. Legal Issues on American Intervention in Venezuela
3.2.7.1. Lack of Justification Based on humanitarian Concerns
3.2.7.2. Lack of Justification for Attacking venezuela on Grounds  
of self-defense
3.2.7.3. intermeddling with the sovereignty of venezuela  
and the doctrine of vicarious Liability
3.2.7.4. the Legitimacy of the Presidency of Nicolás Maduro  
from the international Perspective
3.2.7.5. violation of the Permanent sovereignty  
over Natural resources of venezuelan People
Conclusion
General Background
On 11 January 1961, President dwight d. eisenhower delivered an epic farewell 
address warning the world about the cataclysmic rise of the “Military-industrial 
Complex.”1 he bemoaned how this unholy alliance triangulating among political, 
military and business interests posed an existential threat to geopolitical stability by 
fueling conflicts and “regime change” which is euphemism for coups.2 in retrospect, 
this statement was somehow ironical considering his stellar and decorated military 
career as five-star general who served as supreme Commander of the Allied 
expeditionary Force during the second world war.3 No sooner had eisenhower 
retired than his speech turn prophetic after western powers embarked on a ferocious 
and nefarious campaign of meaningless military interventions across the Global 
1  eisenhower warns u.s. of the Military-industrial Complex (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=8y06NsBBrty.
2  Ann scales & Laura spitz, The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1(3) seattle Journal of 
social Justice 541, 542 (2002).
3  Charles J. dunlap, The Military-Industrial Complex, 140(3) daedalus 135, 137 (2011).
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south and eastern europe under the guise of fighting communism and spreading 
liberal democracy.
Close to six decades later eisenhower’s prophecy is well portrayed in the political 
upheavals bedeviling ukraine and the Bolivarian republic of venezuela (hereinafter 
venezuela). in ukraine the “euromaiden revolution” that was largely supported by 
NAtO and eu led to the ultimate downfall and subsequent exile of President viktor 
yanukovych. until his political downfall, yanukovych, a close ally of President vladimir 
Putin was considered the buffer zone against the volatile encroachment of eu and 
NAtO into russia’s geopolitical sphere of influence. Consequent to this political 
turmoil, the country was embroiled in civil strife that led to the ultimate secession 
of the Crimea region which elected to join the russian Federation.
Conversely, the political rise of hugo Chávez venezuela coincided with the frosty 
relationship between usA and venezuela. the abrasive and populist leader aligned 
himself with the Cuban patriarch Fidel Castro in order to neuter America’s dominance 
in the region. On the economic front, he denied American corporations profits by 
nationalizing the lucrative venezuelan oil industry. Furthermore, he embarked on 
a campaign against imperialism across Latin America in order to counteract iron 
clout of American corporations. On the geopolitical front, he aligned himself with 
russia, China, iran, iraq, syria and Zimbabwe in order to challenge the American and 
western europe global dominance.4 After his death in March 2013 his loyal deputy 
and anointed successor Nicolás Maduro followed his footsteps by implementing 
Bolivarian and anti-American policies. this cavalier attitude led to the usA issuing 
economic sanctions an act which aggravated the economic turmoil that continues 
to plague the country.
Consequently, this conflict hit a peak after the election of President donald trump 
in 2016 who later appointed John Bolton as the National security Advisor.5 during an 
interview on Fox News Bolton branded venezuela the second limb of the “troika of 
tyranny” alongside Cuba and Nicaragua all of whom continue to threaten democracy in 
Latin America.6 this precarious situation was exacerbated after a failed drone attack on 
President Maduro in August 2018.7 thereafter, Juan Guaidó, President of the National 
4  damon Coletta, Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations as a Coordinate System, 36(5) Armed Forces & society 
843, 844 (2010).
5  Mark Landler & Maggie haberman, Trump Chooses Bolton for 3rd Security Adviser as Shake-Up Continues, 
the New york times, 22 March 2018 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/
us/politics/hr-mcmaster-trump-bolton.html.
6  Julian Borger, Bolton Praises Bolsonaro While Declaring “Troika of Tyranny” in Latin America, the Guardian, 
1 November 2018 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/01/
trump-admin-bolsonaro-praise-john-bolton-troika-tyranny-latin-america.
7  Christoph koettl & Barbara Marcolini, A Closer Look at the Drone Attack on Maduro in Venezuela, the 
New york times, 10 August 2018 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/
world/americas/venezuela-video-analysis.html.
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Assembly of venezuela declared himself President of venezuela. this drastic declaration 
was supported by large swathes of western countries including western countries 
including usA, uk, Canada, France, Germany, sweden, denmark and Brazil.8 however, 
this regime change failed after Guaidó interim presidency was nullified by the supreme 
tribunal of Justice (stJ) thereby reaffirming the Maduro presidency.
this political impasse prompted President donald trump to admit the use of force 
in removing President Maduro from power was still a “possible option.”9 this was 
a shocking remark coming from a President who had campaigned on a platform of 
restructuring NAtO and ending needless military campaigns that nearly bankrupted 
his country.10 Legally speaking, this statement raised the pertinent issue as to whether 
usA was justified to use force as against venezuela in light of the united Nations 
Charter and the relevant principles of international customary law. On a more 
abstract level, i shall argue in the negative, since venezuela has not demonstrated 
any form of military aggression towards the united states and its allies. therefore, 
it goes without saying America has failed to satisfy the international legal threshold 
to invoke the use of force against venezuela.
it later emerged American intervention was driven by ulterior motives after John 
Bolton confirmed the u.s. government was reaching out to various oil corporations 
intending to invest in venezuela after the regime change.11 this appalling admission 
raised the legal dilemma as to whether the American strategic interest in venezuelan 
energy sector violates the principle of permanent control of natural resources. in essence, 
this legal principle is inextricably connected to sovereignty and territorial integrity 
since it gives individual countries the absolute right to control and dispose their natural 
resources.12 in hindsight, it coincided during decolonization in order to give the countries 
the secure control of their resources from their former colonial masters.13
in this case if the u.s. led intervention is centered on securing controlling the oil 
reserves then it amounts to gross violation of the right of the venezuelan people 
8  tom Phillips, Venezuela’s Juan Guaidó Offers Nicolás Maduro Amnesty If He Goes Quietly, the Guardian, 
25 January 2019 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/25/
venezuelas-juan-Guaidó-offers-nicolas-maduro-amnesty-if-he-goes-quietly.
9  trump Administration warns Military Action in venezuela “Possible,” vOA News, 1 May 2019 (Oct. 30, 
2019), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvjMtez0jq0.
10  Joyce P. kaufman, The US Perspective on NATO Under Trump: Lessons of the Past and Prospects for the 
Future, 93(2) international Affairs 251 (2017).
11  w.J. hennigan, Inside John Bolton’s Month-Long P.R. Campaign Against Venezuela’s Government, time, 
30 January 2019 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://time.com/5516920/inside-john-boltons-month-
long-p-r-campaign-against-venezuelas-government/.
12  endalew Lijalem enyew, Application of the Right to Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources to Indigenous 
Peoples: Assessment of Current Legal Developments, 8 Artic review on Law and Politics 222, 223 (2017).
13  ikechi Mgbeoji, Beyond Rhetoric: State Sovereignty, Common Concern, and the Inapplicability of the Common 
Heritage Concept to Plant Genetic Resources, 16(4) Leiden Journal of international Law 821, 826 (2003).
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to control their natural resources. in essence, if western countries that prop up 
illegitimate regimes to protect their economic interest in gross violation of the right 
of the venezuelan people to control and dispose their natural resources.
this synopsis forms the centerpiece of this paper. it gives a critical analysis on the 
use of force within the context of international rule of law. i for one will argue the 
u.N. Charter alongside other international legal documents prohibits the use of force 
except for purposes of self-defense.14 Furthermore, i shall rely on the principal-agency 
theory to expound the connection between foreign interests and the opposition 
leaders who instigate illegitimate regime change in their home countries. doubtless, 
the sovereign power to change government vests with the people of ukraine and 
venezuela and not the high powered political bureaucracy in washington and 
Brussels. therefore, it is the people who have the obligation to spearhead political 
change in accordance with the prevailing constitutional order.
in cementing this discussion, this paper shall rely on the jurisprudence of the inter-
national Court of Justice (iCJ) as a tool for mapping out the legal terrains on the use 
of force in international law.15 Going by the dominant legal order, it is fair to surmise 
the political changes in ukraine and venezuela are tainted with mischief, malice and 
mala fide due to the underlying foreign strategic interests rather than representing 
the welfare of the people.
Caveat, this being a legal paper and not a political opinion, should not be construed 
in any way, shape or form as a campaign to whip up support or win sympathy for 
Presidents yanukovych and Maduro. A closer analysis of their political reign signifies 
multidimensional shortcomings ranging from political repression to endemic 
corruption and cronyism.16 For example the Chávez-Maduro hegemony has been 
assailed for promoting and incubating institutional and endemic corruption hence 
the term estado delincuente (criminal state).17 however, this administrative shortfall 
does not negate their legitimacy which can only be nullified by the electorate and 
not foreign intervention.
By and large, this paper is divided into four major parts. the first part will form 
the legal foundation of this paper. it gives a comprehensive legal analysis on the 
use of force and regime change in international law. in addition, it underscores 
a precise discussion of the principle of permanent control over natural resources 
in public international law. Furthermore, i shall elaborate on the agency theory as 
14  Michael wood, International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice?, 53 indian Journal of 
international Law 345, 346 (2013).
15  Corinne Lewis, Don’t Stop Now: The Development of the International Law Right to Use Force in Self-
Defense, iv(3) Journal of international Law & Policy 3:1 (2007).
16  taras kuzio, Ukraine’s Other War: The Rule of Law and Siloviky After the Euromaidan Revolution, 29(4) 
Journal of slavic Military studies 681, 682 (2016).
17  Margarita López Maya, Populism, 21st-Century Socialism and Corruption in Venezuela, 149(1) thesis 
eleven 67, 68 (2018).
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the nexus between NAtO and eu and the illegitimate leaders in foreign jurisdiction. 
the second part will espouse the political history of ukraine and venezuela. i for one 
will argue the ousting of Presidents yanukovych and Maduro was illegitimate for 
controverting the relevant provisions of their respective constitutions. this portion 
shall give a concise study of neoconservatism as the modern day reincarnation of the 
Military-industrial Complex. indeed, a study by the American think tank Brookings 
institution established at the turn of the 21st century the Military-industrial Complex 
has undergone a fundamental shift in terms of form and structure.18 therefore, it 
is prudent to study the nexus between neoconservatism and the aggressive use 
of force in contemporary international law. Finally, the last part shall contain the 
concluding remarks. For clarity purposes the word western powers as used in this 
article means NAtO and eu.
1. Introduction
territorial integrity and national sovereignty are the hallmarks of nation states within 
the precepts of public international law.19 Needless to say, these cardinal principles 
enable countries to exercise political control and autonomy without unnecessary 
interference by foreign and powerful entities. these legal doctrines originated from 
the westphalian model of 1648 that acted as the foundation of international relations.20 
however, after the second world war these amorphous principles were codified into 
international law after the promulgation of the united Nations Charter.21
On the subject of the use of force in international law, the u.N. Charter stands 
on the principles of jus ad bellum (law on the use of force) and jus in bello (law on 
the prevention of war) as a means of maintaining international law and order.22 
Firstly, Article 2(1) of the Charter recognizes one of the principles of u.N. is sovereign 
equality of all its Members.23 As hans kelsen rightly noted sovereign equality of states 
18  Jason tama, There’s No App for That: Disrupting the Military-Industrial Complex, Center for 21st Century 
security and intelligence – Brookings (July 2015) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/No-app-for-that_final-7815.pdf.
19  winston P. Nagan & Craig hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and 
International Relations, 43(1) Columbia Journal of transnational Law 141, 142 (2004).
20  harold hongju koh et al., Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106(8) yale Law Journal 2599, 
2659 (1997).
21  Bardo Fassbender, What’s in a Name? The International Rule of Law and the United Nations Charter, 
17(3) Chinese Journal of international Law 761, 767 (2018).
22  Öyküirmakkesen, The Notion of Armed Attack Under the UN Charter and the Notion of International 
Armed Conflict – Interrelated or Distinct?, LL.M. Paper, Geneva Academy of international humanitarian 
Law and human rights (August 2014) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at http://www.prix-henry-dunant.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014_irMAkkeseN_Paper.pdf.
23  Charter of the united Nations and statute of the international Court of Justice (1945) (Oct. 30, 2019), 
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf.
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is only subject to international legal order and not the legal regime of other states.24 
the letter and spirit behind this overarching principle is to preserve the political 
autonomy of individual member states from intrusion by foreign and more powerful 
entities. this legal provision is further amplified by Article 2(4) of the Charter which 
states that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the united 
Nations.25
A cursory glance of this important clause brings out two essential legal issues. 
Firstly, the member states should limit the use of military force to defending territorial 
integrity or political independence of country.26 As kamal khan rightly observes the 
right to self-defense is defined by four major elements; who can exercise this right, as 
against whom, the subject matter being protected by the response, the method of 
response, instrument and degree applied in the response.27 therefore, it is germane 
to consider these factors when examining the use of force in international law.
secondly, the manner of enforcing this military power should conform to the 
legal threshold of the u.N. Charter.28 this position is amplified by Article 51 of the 
Charter which permits the collective use of force for self-defense against armed 
invasion of a member state.29 however, there is rider to this measure which must be 
approved by the security Council in accordance with Chapter vii of the Charter.30 
in dissecting this provision one may argue member states may invoke individual 
or collective self-defense when responding to armed incursion against another 
member state.31
24  hans kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization, 52(3) 
yale Law Journal 207, 211 (1944).
25  Charter of the united Nations, supra note 23.
26  Oscar schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83(2) American Journal of international Law 259, 
260 (1989).
27  kamal A. khan, Use of Force and Human Rights Under International Law, 3(2) Athens Journal of Law 
141 (2017).
28  david k. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views, 1 
duke Journal of Comparative & international Law 57, 69 (1991).
29  Charter of the united Nations, supra note 23.
30  James A. Green, The Article 51 Reporting Requirement for Self-Defense Actions, 55(3) virginia Journal 
of international Law 563, 565 (2015).
31  robert J. delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure of the. United Nations Collective Security 
System, 56(3) Catholic university Law review 871 (2007).
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1.1. International Legal Instruments
1.1.1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
this document plays a critical role in the crystalizing of human rights within 
the context of customary international law.32 to paraphrase one of framers the 
former American First Lady eleanor roosevelt, the document was not a treaty 
foisted among member states but a declaration that would act as the common 
stand on global human rights.33 Article 21 of declaration recognizes the right to 
express political opinion through elections.34 in addition, Article 21(3) states the 
will of the people shall form the legitimate authority of government through free 
and fair elections conducted through secret ballot. this crucial clause amplifies the 
position of sovereignty and territorial integrity in international law by affirming 
the legitimacy of any government emanates from the people and not foreign 
interests and intervention. in spite of this important provision, the declaration is 
not obligatory in nature a fact which has hindered its universal implementation 
across the globe.35
1.1.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
From the outset this document intended to simplify the civil and political 
dimensions of the udhr. Broadly speaking, it remains one of the most progressive 
and futuristic legal documents on implementation of these rights on global level.36 
Article 1 of the Covenant recognizes the right of the people to determine their 
political status.37 this pivotal provision expounds on the importance of the sovereign 
will of the people in plotting the political course of their country.38 By implication, this 
provision delegitimizes the controversial role of foreign powers in spurring regime 
changes in weaker states across eastern europe and Global south.
32  hurst hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International 
Law, 25(1) Georgia Journal of international and Comparative Law 287, 290 (1996).
33  Anya Luscombe, Eleanor Roosevelt: A Crusading Spirit to Move Human Rights Forward, 36(4) Netherlands 
Quarterly of human rights 241, 245 (2018).
34  universal declaration of human rights (1948) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.un.org/en/
udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf.
35  Jacob dolinger, The Failure of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 47(2) university of Miami 
inter-American Law review 164, 183 (2016).
36  Beth simmons, Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the “International Bill of 
Rights,” 16(2) indiana Journal of Global Legal studies 437 (2008).
37  international Covenant on Civil and Political rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the united 
Nations on 19 december 1966 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/
unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf.
38  Father robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self-Determination: The Meaning of International 
Law, 24(5) Fordham international Law Journal 1477, 1478 (2005).
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1.1.3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
this Covenant was promulgated as tool to crystallize socio-economic rights at the 
international level. within this context, sovereignty recognizes the inherent right of 
the people to control their socio-economic interests without any foreign influence. 
From the inception Article 1 expands the right to self-determination to include the 
freedom to pursue their economic, social and cultural development.39 Moreover, 
Article 1(2) recognizes the inherent right to dispose their natural wealth and resources 
so long as the same does not violate any economic obligations in international law. 
A closer analysis of this clause raises two interesting arguments touching on the 
connection between socio-economic sovereignty and use of force in international law. 
Firstly, it affirms the unfettered right of the people to control their natural resources 
within the precepts of international cooperation and mutual benefits. secondly, it 
prohibits foreign and powerful states from using force in order to expropriate natural 
resources from other states. in summary, it is cogent to argue a broad and purposive 
interpretation of the term “self-determination” in terms of the iCesCr includes the 
right of sovereign states to determine their socio-economic policies.40
1.1.4. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
this important body of international law is basically an offshoot of the u.N. Charter 
with the specific objective promoting peaceful co-existence among member states.41 
the first principle prohibits the use of force to threaten the territorial integrity and 
political independence of other member states or in any manner that controverts the 
letter and spirit of the u.N. Charter.42 it further defines a war of aggression to constitute 
a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international law.
the third principle prohibits states using from threats or using force in order to violate 
existing international boundaries or resolve international disputes.43 Furthermore, 
it prohibits every member states from encouraging or organizing irregular forces 
including armed mercenaries in foreign territories. By the same token, member states 
are forbidden from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil 
39  international Covenant on economic, social and Cultural rights (1966) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/treaties/1976/01/19760103%2009-57%20PM/Ch_iv_03.pdf.
40  Burak Cop & dogan eymirlioglu, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law Towards the 
40th Anniversary of the Adoption of ICCPR and ICESCR, X(4) Perceptions – Journal of international Affairs 
115, 116 (2005).
41  Brad r. roth, Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective 
Control Doctrine, 11(2) Melbourne Journal of international Law 1, 3 (2010).
42  u.N. General Assembly, declaration on Principles of international Law Concerning Friendly relations 
and Co-Operation Among states in Accordance with the Charter of the united Nations, 24 October 
1970, A/res/2625(XXv).
43  Id.
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strife or terrorist acts in foreign territories. it also attaches premium to negotiations as 
means of resolving international dispute under the banner of sovereignty and equality 
of the respective member states.
in summary, this document prohibits member states from interfering with the 
domestic affairs of other member states for whatever reasons be it political, economic, 
social or cultural.
1.1.5. General Assembly Resolution of Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Inter-
vention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and 
Sovereignty
this resolution is equally instrumental role in defining the boundaries on the use 
of force in international law. Paragraph 1 expressly prohibits states from intervening 
in the internal and external affairs of any member states.44 Furthermore, paragraph 2 
prohibits states from supporting any form of clandestine activities that is angled 
overthrowing of the regime of another state.45 According to paragraph 3 the use of 
force to deprive a people their national identity amounts to gross violation of their 
natural rights and the principle of non-intervention.46 Paragraph 5 recognizes the 
absolute right of states to pursue their political, social, economic and cultural system 
without meddling by other member states.47 Paragraph 6 recognizes the right to self-
determination among all the member states.48 Finally paragraph 7 defines states to 
include individual or a group of states.49
1.1.6. Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law
this legal principle seeks to reconcile the doctrine of national sovereignty with 
the right to control natural resources.50 it emanated during the mid-20th century 
to enable newly independent states to secure control of their natural resources 
from their former colonial masters and multinational corporations.51 Peculiarly, this 
44  u.N. General Assembly, declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic Affairs of states 
and the Protection of their independence and sovereignty, 21 december 1965, A/res/2131(XX).
45  Id.
46  Id.
47  Id.
48  Id.
49  Id.
50  Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource Allocation: 
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45(3) vanderbilt Journal of transnational 
Law 785, 792 (2012).
51  ricardo Pereira & Orla Gough, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the 21st Century: Natural 
Resource Governance and the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 
14(2) Melbourne Journal of international Law 451, 458 (2013).
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futuristic doctrine is not contained in a single text, if anything, scattered across 
a spectrum of conventions to resolutions from the General Assembly of the united 
Nations. At the inception the framers of the organization did not envisage the 
resolutions as authoritative source of international law as signified by Article 38(1) 
of the iCJ statute. however, over time these resolutions began to play a critical role 
in defining the legal norms on the global platform.52
Firstly, General Assembly resolution 626 (vii) of 1952 recommended the recognition 
of the inherent right of states to own and control their natural resources.53 this 
document was followed up by General Assembly resolution 1314 (Xiii) of 1958 which 
recommended the establishment of a commission to explore the relationship between 
permanent control over natural resources and the right to self-determination.54
in addition, General Assembly resolution 1803 (Xvii) of 1962 which is known 
as “Permanent sovereignty over Natural resources” is germane to this discussion.55 
According to Lorenzo Cotula this resolution magnified the link between sovereignty 
and the right of nation states to control and dispose natural resources.56 this legal 
standpoint is echoed by sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi who identified five major 
components of this principle as (1) the right to freely dispose their natural resources; 
(2) the right to explore and exploit natural resources freely; (3) the right to use natural 
resources for development; (4) the right to regulate foreign investment and (5) the 
right to settle disputes on the basis of natural law.57 if one is to adopt a holistic 
understanding of these five elements as proposed by Ng’ambi it is fair to assert 
this legal principle is well structured to protect the natural resources of weaker and 
underdeveloped states from exploitation by powerful foreign entities. this resolution 
was later supported by resolution 2158 (XXi) that affirmed the right to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources as a means of economic development among 
the newly independent states.58 this was a strategic measure that was angled toward 
52  Gregory J. kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of 
International Law in United States Courts, 1983 duke Law Journal 876 (1983).
53  u.N. General Assembly, right to exploit Freely Natural wealth and resources, 21 december 1952, A/res/ 
626(vii), at 18, para. 1.
54  u.N. General Assembly, recommendations Concerning international respect for the right of Peoples 
and Nations to self-determination, 12 december 1958, A/res/1314(Xiii).
55  u.N. General Assembly, Permanent sovereignty over Natural resources, 14 december 1962, A/res/ 
1803(Xvii).
56  Lorenzo Cotula, Reconsidering Sovereignty, Ownership and Consent in Natural Resource Contracts: From 
Concepts to Practice in European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2018 143, 147 (M. Bungenberg 
et al. (eds.), Cham: springer, 2019).
57  sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Sanctity of Contracts, from 
the Angle of Lucrum Cessans, 12(2) Loyola university Chicago international Law review 153, 156 (2015).
58  u.N. General Assembly, Permanent sovereignty over Natural resources, 25 November 1966, A/res/ 
2158(XXi).
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improving the socio-economic status of the nascent countries across the Global 
south and east.
Apart from the spectrum of general assembly resolutions this legal principle is 
recognized by other international legal instruments. First, is the Charter of economic 
rights and duties of states (Cerds) which outlines the international legal principles on 
trade and development.59 in essence it intended to resolve the socio-economic tensions 
and disputes between the industrialized and underdeveloped countries.60 A plain 
reading of the Preamble indicates the overarching objective of this document is to 
establish a new international economic order based on equality, interdependence and 
promoting common interest.61 Chapter of the Charter affirms the political and economic 
relations of member states shall be governed by the principles of sovereignty, equality, 
non-intervention, non-aggression, peaceful coexistence and equal rights and self-
determination of the people.62 Article 1 states every state has the sovereign power to 
elect the political and socio-economic system in accordance with the will of the people 
without outside influence, threats and interference.63 Article 2 confirms every state has 
the right to exercise full permanent control over its natural resources and economic 
activities.64 Article 5 stipulates the state has the right to associate in organization of 
primary commodity producers in order to develop their national economies and secure 
financing of their economies.65 Further to that, Article 7 outlines the primary obligation 
of the state to promote economic, social and cultural development of its people. Finally, 
Article 16 obligates all states to individually and collectively eliminate any form of 
economic imperialism and foreign occupation and aggression.66
Finally, the rio declaration on environment and development commonly referred 
to as “earth summit” also recognizes this legal principle.67 this principal objective behind 
this futuristic document was to implement the hard laws on economic development 
and environmental concern as a follow up to the stockholm declaration.68 More 
59  u.N. General Assembly, Charter of economic rights and duties of states, 6 November 1974, A/res/ 
3281(XXiX).
60  Joseph C. vanzant, Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Solution to the Development Aid 
Problem?, 4(2) Georgia Journal of international and Comparative Law 441 (1974).
61  Charter of economic rights and duties of states, supra note 59.
62  Id.
63  Id.
64  Id.
65  Id.
66  Id.
67  the rio declaration on environment and development (1992) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at http://
www.unesco.org/education/pdf/riO_e.PdF.
68  david A. wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, 
or Vice Versa, 29(3) Georgia Law review 599, 601 (1995).
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specifically, principle two of the rio declaration recognizes the inherent right of states 
to exploit their resources in line with united Nations Charter and the relevant principles 
of international customary law.69 As Ng’ambi rightly notes this clause grants the states 
the right to oversee the economic activities of both domestic and foreign entities 
operating within their territories.70 in closing, it is fair to surmise there is an inextricable 
connection between the national sovereignty and the principle of permanent control 
over natural resources.
1.1.7. The Applicability of Vicarious Liability in Public International Law
in hindsight, the entire premise of this paper is deeply anchored on the political 
and socio-economic sovereignty of ukraine and venezuela. Moreover, any legitimate 
regime change should be sponsored by the people in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of their Constitution. however, if the change is illegal and engineered 
by foreign factors then it creates a principal-agency relationship between the local 
usurpers and their foreign agitators who are vicariously liable for their actions. this 
agency theory is mostly applicable in the Anglo-American (common law) system 
where the principal is liable for the actions of the agent.71 in this regard, similar 
arguments apply to illegal interference with the political rights of the people through 
undemocratic regime change.
secondly, the principal is held accountable for being the ultimate beneficiary 
for the actions and policies of the agents. indeed, this practice has partially taken 
root among corporations who are held liable for committing offences in foreign 
countries.72 For instance the Alien tort Claims Act, permits litigants to lodge claims 
against American corporations in the usA.73 For offences committed in foreign 
jurisdictions in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain the supreme Court stated the required legal 
threshold is gross violation of a “norm of customary international law so well defined 
as to support the creation of a federal remedy.”74 therefore, if corporations who are 
not primary signatories to international legal instruments are criminally liable for 
intermeddling with the domestic affairs of other nations, then why nation states 
should be held to a different standard?
this legal concern is equally addressed by American Jurists eric Posner and Alan 
sykes who observe international legal instruments are analogous to contracts among 
69 wirth 1995, at 601.
70  sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi, Reconciling Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Pacta Sunt 
Servanda, international Journal of Multi-disciplinary research 1, 5, 6 (2018).
71  Paula J. dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72(3) university of Pittsburgh Law review 495, 498 (2011).
72  erin stapp, Third-Party Liability for Violations of the Law of Nations: Apply International Law, the Law of 
the Situs, or Domestic Standards, 49(2) santa Clara Law review 495, 498 (2009).
73  the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, 1 stat. 73).
74  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 u.s. 692, 736 (2005).
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the nations.75 subsequently, any element of breach should warrant legal sanctions 
and remedies. they further argue states are vicariously liable for the actions of their 
officials and proxies that threaten or interfere with the stability and security of the 
other member states. they cite the iCJ decisions of Nicaragua and Hostages cases 
where the usA and iran were held accountable for the actions of their proxies in 
foreign jurisdictions.
By the same token, this legal position is supported by the commentary of the 
international Law Commission on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful 
Acts.76 Article 1 recognizes the liability of nation states for breach of international 
liability. under Article 2 a wrongful act or omission is one which constitutes breach of 
international obligation.77 More specifically, Article 3 states that a wrongful conduct 
is attributable to the state if the organ or if the perpetrator acted as an agent of the 
state. Article 4 defines wrongful conduct to include any action authorized by an 
organ of the central government or territorial authority. Moreover, Article 5 adopts 
an expansive definition by stipulating any act committed by a person though not an 
organ of the state but acting in that capacity shall be attributed to the authorizing 
state. similarly, Article 6 extends these same broad standards to include the conduct 
of state organs.
Article 7 defines an act of the state under international law if the organ is 
empowered to operate on behalf of the state even if it exceeds its authority. Article 8 
attributes an act under international law to the state if the organ operates under 
the command and control of the said state.78 this pivotal clause offers wide latitude 
for nations to be held accountable for the actions of their proxies who violate 
international law in foreign jurisdictions.
in that regard, Posner and sykes cite the example of the Hostages case where the 
government of iran was held accountable for the actions of the radical students who 
seized the American embassy in tehran.79 it was argued the inflammatory remarks 
of Ayatollah khomeini encouraged the students to “expand the attacks” against 
America. in addition, his ostensible reluctance to expel them from precincts of the 
embassy largely contributed to the crisis.80 Noteworthy, these provisions are not 
75  eric A. Posner & Alan O. sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under 
International Law, 9(1) American Law and economic review 72, 100 (2007).
76  united Nations, draft Articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries (2001) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
77  Phosphates in Morocco Case (Italy v. France) (1938) P.C.i.J., ser. A/B, No. 74.
78  Id.
79  Posner & sykes 2007, at 90.
80  warren Christopher & richard M. Mosk, The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: 
Implications for International Dispute Resolution and Diplomacy, 7(2) Pepperdine dispute resolution 
Law Journal 165, 167 (2007).
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mandatory since they are more or less recommendations by the international Law 
Commission. that notwithstanding they play a critical determining the liability of 
states in public international law.
2. Jurisprudence on Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
the iCJ as established under Article 1 of the iCJ statute is the global court 
obligated to resolve disputes among the member states of the u.N.81 in addition, it has 
the mandate to interpret and offer advisory opinion on the matters emanating from 
the u.N. Charter.82 Most importantly, Article 38 outlines the sources of international 
law as international convention, customary international law, general principles of 
law among civilized nations, subject to Article 59 the judicial decisions and teachings 
of revered international legal scholars (opinio juris). historically speaking, the court 
has played a critical role in developing the jurisprudence and customary law on 
public international law.83
2.1. Nicaragua v. USA (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua)84
this by far is one of the most futuristic and landmark decisions of the court consi-
dering the fact the legal issues revolved around the geopolitical tensions of the Cold war.85 
the gravamen of the dispute stemmed from the controversial activities of the contras 
in Nicaragua and neighboring el salvador.86 the socialist leaning sandinista government 
accused the usA of breaching international law by supporting this right wing paramilitary 
movement in overthrowing the government. they further argued America should be held 
accountable for the actions of the contras who unleashed grotesque waves of civilian 
terror characterized by massive displacement, torture, sexual violence and assassinations. 
the Nicaraguans further submitted America had violated Articles 2(4) and 51 of the u.N. 
Charter by supporting the contras through funds, arms, intelligence and military training 
yet there was no evidence Nicaragua posed a security threat to America.
81  Zakiyyu Muhammad & u.s. Jahun, An Examination of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice 1945 as a Source of International Law, 7(8) international Journal of scientific research 
and Publications 427 (2017).
82  Id. Art. 36(2)(a) of the statute.
83  Loretta Chan, The Dominance of the International Court of Justice in the Creation of Customary 
International Law, 6(1) southampton student review 44 (2016).
84  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America) (1986) i.C.J. 14.
85  keith highet, Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81(1) American Journal of international Law 
1, 2 (1987).
86  Noreen M. tama, Nicaragua v. United States: The Power of the International Court of Justice to Indicate 
Interim Measures in Political Disputes, 4(1) dickinson Journal of international Law 65, 66 (1985).
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From inception the usA challenged the jurisdiction of the court arguing the dispute 
should have been lodged before the security Council in line with Article 24 of the 
u.N. Charter. Contrary to the accusations, the Americans argued the contras were 
instrumental in containing the threat posed as pose by the sandinistas to Nicaragua 
and el salvador. More specifically, Nicaragua was instrumental in channeling support to 
socialist rebels intending to overthrow several governments in Central America, namely 
el salvador, Guatemala, honduras and Costa rica. in addition usA invoked Article 36(2) 
of the iCJ statute thereby contesting the jurisdiction of the court to determine matters 
touching on multiple treatises with el salvador, honduras and Costa rica. in closing 
its submissions, the usA argued the doctrine of “collective self-defense” on behalf of 
el salvador as member of the Organization of American states (OAs).87
On the issue of jurisdiction the court dismissed the preliminary objection on grounds 
that both the court and the security Council had parallel mandate to determine the 
matter. in essence, Article 24 of the Charter used the word “primary” and not “exclusive” 
which meant nothing precluded the iCJ from adjudicating the dispute. in foresight, 
this was an ironical argument coming from the usA because during the Hostages case 
the iranians had raised a similar issue only for them to strenuously objected citing the 
court had unfettered jurisdiction to determine the matter.88
upon dismissal of the objection the usA conveniently abandoned the 
proceedings in protest against alleged bias by the court. however, Nicaragua relied 
on Article 36 of the statute which allowed the courts to institute ex parte proceedings 
and judgement against a party that failed to comply with the rules. in the final 
judgement the court agreed the usA had the right to opt out the various sections of 
the u.N. Charter as invoked by Nicaragua. Nonetheless, it was bound by the relevant 
principles of the customary international law because on various occasions it had 
expressed its support for the doctrine non-intervention. On the issue of collective 
self-defense the court reasoned the state invoking this defense must be the primary 
target of direct armed attack by a hostile nation which was not the case herein.
thirdly, the American actions of supporting the contras violated the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Nicaragua. however, the illegal activities of the contrast 
could not be attributed to the usA since it was not in absolute control of their actions. 
in strict legal sense, this limb of the verdict was wanting since American support was 
essential in the spearheading the military campaigns by the contras. this position was 
confirmed by foreign policy of the President ronald reagan and secretary of state 
George shultz who were determined to eject the sandinistas from power.89
87  Article 5(f ) of the Charter of the Organization of the American states signed at Bogota, Colombia on 
30 April 1948 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/uNts/volume%20
119/volume-119-i-1609-english.pdf.
88  theodore M. Lieverman, Law and Power: Some Reflections on Nicaragua, the United States, and the 
World Court, 10(2) Maryland Journal of international Law 295, 299 (1986).
89  Anthony d’Amato, Nicaragua and International Law: The “Academic” and the “Real”, 79(3) American 
Journal of international Law 657, 659 (1995).
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As Carlos Bernheim notes, by offering military support to the contras the united 
states was waging a “covert” war against Nicaragua and by extension interfering with 
the domestic affairs.90 inasmuch as the u.s. had no control over the contras it was 
foreseeable their actions might have caused undue harm and destruction among 
innocent civilians in Nicaragua. in spite of the ideological division, this decision is 
important in highlighting how interference by foreign countries through domestic 
proxies poses a serious threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2.2. USA v. Iran (Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff 
in Tehran)91
this case was essentially the geopolitical permutation of the frosty relationship 
between usA and iran after the islamic revolution of 1979 that ended the autocracy 
of its strongest ally in the region Mohammad reza shah.92 this dispute began after 
a group of belligerent university students seized the u.s. embassy in tehran and took 
66 Americans hostage.93 the usA alleged the students were acting under the blessings 
and control of the supreme leader Ayatollah khomeini who wanted to reignite the 
fading euphoria of the once vibrant revolution. in further response, the usA imposed 
economic sanctions and froze foreign iranian assets worth billions of dollars.94 
however, the parties agreed to settle the economic dispute in a forum arbitrated by 
Algeria which was later known as Algiers Accords of 19 January 1981.95
however, pertaining to the diplomatic and political standoff the usA opted to 
file a suit against iran for breaching the u.N. Charter and the vienna Convention on 
diplomatic relations. subsequently, the iCJ found iran liable for the actions of the 
students who were “agents” acting under the control and for the ultimate benefit of 
the regime. this decision underscored the vicarious culpability of member states that 
infringe upon the sovereignty and democratic integrity of other member states. in 
90  Carlos tünnermann Bernheim, United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua and Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter, 11(1) yale Journal of international Law 104 (1985).
91  Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran) 
(1980) i.C.J. 3.
92  richard w. Cottam, Human Rights in Iran Under the Shah, 12(1) Case western reserve Journal of inter-
national Law 121, 122 (1980).
93  steven r. swanson, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: A Policy Analysis of the Expropriation Cases, 18(2) Case 
western reserve Journal of international Law 307 (1986).
94  robert M. McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis and U.S. Law, 2(2) Northwestern Journal of international Law & 
Business 384, 387 (1980).
95  iran-u.s. Claims trib. rep. 3 (1981–82), 20 i.L.M. 223 (1981). these documents include: the declaration of 
the Government of the democratic and Popular republic of Algeria relating to the Commitments Made 
by iran and the united states, id. at 5, 20 i.L.M. at 224; undertakings of the Government of iran and the 
united states, id. at 7, 20 i.L.M. at 229; the declaration of the Government of the democratic and Popular 
republic of Algeria Concerning the settlement of Claims by iran and the united states, id. at 9, 20 i.L.M. 
at 230; and the escrow Agreement, id. at 12, 20 i.L.M. at 234. See swanson 1986, at 307–308.
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foresight, this decision was instrumental in addressing violent protests that threaten 
the integrity and sovereignty of other member states.
2.3. Iran v. USA (Case Concerning Oil Platforms)96
this case granted the court the perfect opportunity to expound the legal 
principles on the use of force and self-defense under international law. the genesis 
of this suit began when the u.s. Navy launched two missile attacks that destroyed 
iranian oil platforms and production complexes along the Gulf of Persia. inasmuch 
as the American government conceded responsibility it defended the attack on 
grounds of self-defense after iran had attacked its warship known as Sea Isle City 
which has berthed at the harbor of kuwaiti. in addition, the usA accused iran of 
launching a mine that struck its warship Samuel B. Robertson while navigating along 
international waters off the coast of Bahrain.
the court held that the right to self-defense presumes an armed attack against 
the state exercising that right. this means the burden of proof lies with the state 
invoking this right in response to the aggressor to demonstrate it was responding to 
an armed attack from a hostile nation. in this case there was “inconclusive evidence” 
that iran was responsible for the attacks against the American vessels. even if one 
assumed that iran was responsible for the attack, it did not satisfy the legal threshold 
necessity and proportionality of an armed attack as envisaged by the court in the 
Nicaragua decision. Nonetheless, due to the prevailing economic sanctions there 
was no commercial relationship between the two countries hence counterclaim 
against the usA for the economic losses incurred by iran was summarily dismissed. 
Consequent to Nicaragua v. USA, this decision was instrumental in outlining the 
parameters on the use of force in international law.
2.4. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons97
this matter was referred by the security Council to the court for advisory opinion.98 
the legal issue was whether the use of nuclear weapons was permissible under 
international law. it was held that the use of such weapons is permissible within the 
reasonable limits and requirements of Article 51 of the u.N. Charter. however, this 
limited use should be defined by two major principles. First is the need to distinguish 
between combatant and civilian targets. secondly, is the need to avoid unnecessary 
suffering of combatants even if such threats or weapons were used on military 
targets. this decision expounded on the collective role of the security Council in 
monitoring the use of force in international law.
96  Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) (2003) i.C.J. 161.
97  Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) i.C.J. 226.
98  u.N. General Assembly resolution 49/75k adopted on 15 december 1994.
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2.5. Yugoslavia v. NATO (Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force in Interna-
tional Law)99
this matter comprised of a series of ten cases as filed by yugoslavia against indi-
vidual member states of NAtO after they launched a string of military airstrikes in 
kosovo under the banner of “Operation Allied Forces.” the applicant argued the 
court had jurisdiction to determine the dispute under Article iX of the Convention 
on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 1948 and Article 36(2) of the iCJ statute. 
in addition, it filed an interlocutory application requesting for preliminary stay of 
the airstrikes. in that regard, the legal issue was whether under international law 
NAtO was justified to use force against yugoslavia. in response, each of the individual 
member states of NAtO filed a counter memorial seeking to dismiss the suit since the 
applicant lacked the legal standing to file the suit. they argued the applicant Federal 
republic of yugoslavia which comprised of serbia and Montenegro had never applied 
for u.N. Membership in accordance with the Article 35 of the u.N. Charter.
in addition, the united states and spain raised preliminary objections that the 
court lacked jurisdiction in light of the reservation to clause iX of the Genocide 
Convention. the court upheld the objection since the issue of jurisdiction was optional 
and proceeded to expunge the cases from the series. during the substantive hearing 
of the main suit the court expressed deep concerns about the humanitarian tragedy 
in the region coupled with the fact that the matter raises serious legal issues. the court 
in its side note advised both parties to act within the conformity of the u.N. Charter 
and other rules of international law. however, the court stated it lacked prima facie 
jurisdiction over the dispute since the applicant was not a member of the u.N. at the 
time of filing of the memorial in line with Article 35 of the u.N. Charter and proceeded 
to dismiss the memorial.
2.6. Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory100
this matter was referred to the iCJ by the u.N. General Assembly under Article 65 
of the u.N. Charter. the epicenter of this dispute revolved around the decision by the 
israeli government to erect a “security fence” around Palestinian occupied territories 
stretching from the Gaza strip, west Bank all the way to east Jerusalem. the legal issue 
was whether israel had breached the hague Convention regulations and Geneva 
Conventions together with the relevant principles of international customary role.
the court ruled in the affirmative holding that the “security fence” was a permanent 
structure that infringed upon the freedom of movement of the Palestinian people 
under Article 12 of the iCCPr.
99  Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America) (1996) i.C.J. 916.
100  Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (2004) i.C.J. 136.
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it was held israel had breached the hague and Geneva Conventions together 
with the relevant as aspects of customary international law despite not being 
a signatory to the said treatise.101 in essence, the court affirmed the holding of 
the Corfu Channel case by holding that non signatory states can be held liable for 
breaching international customary law. Finally, the court held that israel activities 
in the Palestinian territory fell well within the precepts of Article 4 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention which protects civilian during civil wars. this clause defined the 
protected persons protected by convention as those within a conflict/occupied zone 
or in the control of an occupying foreign party. in this instance the court adopted an 
expansive and liberal interpretation of this clause since the Palestine being a territory 
and not a signatory to the convention.
2.7. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (Case Concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo)102
the legal issue was whether uganda had breached the sovereignty of the drC by 
deploying its army inside the eastern exterior border of drC. in retrospect, uganda had 
played a key role in arming the unified rebel movement Alliance of democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFdL or AdFLC) led by Laurent kabila who ultimately 
overthrew the long term despot Mobutu sese seko in 1997. upon ascending to power 
President kabila issued an executive order demanding rwanda and “any other foreign 
states” to withdraw all their troops stationed in the eastern town of Goma.
however, uganda defied the order and deployed its troops to the town of kitona 
then controlled by the MLC rebel Movement. the drC argued uganda offered these 
insurgents military and financial support in order to destabilize the kabila regime. this 
sudden change of loyalty prompted President kabila to solicit for support from his 
southern allies Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe who in turn launched a swift onslaught 
that quelled the rebellion. in 2002 the parties to the conflict agreed to a ceasefire 
prompting uganda to recall all its troops stationed in the country.103 Nonetheless, 
the Congolese government accused uganda of leaving behind “a complex network 
of warlords” who plundered and destabilized the country. in essence, drC argued 
uganda’s support amounted to belligerent occupation in flippant disregard of Articles 
2(4) and 51 of the u.N. Charter.
in a resounding response, uganda accused the drC of infringing upon its 
sovereignty after platoon of its forces stormed its embassy in kinshasa, harassed its 
staff and confiscated their belongings. in that regard uganda invoked a spectrum 
101  Jay Butler, Responsibility for Regime Change, 114(3) Columbia Law review 503, 519 (2014).
102  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda) (2005) i.C.J. 168.
103  inter-Congolese Political Negotiations: the Final Act (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://peacemaker.
un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Cd_030402_sunCityAgreement.pdf.
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of provisions of the vienna Convention on diplomatic relations of 1961. Finally, 
uganda submitted it was not bound by the executive order executive since it does 
not expressly demand its troops to withdraw from the country.
ultimately, the court concurred with the applicants’ case that ugandan activities 
infringed upon the sovereignty of the drC after kabila accused uganda of invading 
the country. in addition, uganda had breached the scope of invitation since it acted 
outside the mutual understanding of both parties. thirdly the phrase “any other 
country” as captured in the executive order included ugandan troops. however, the 
counterclaim was dismissed for want of sufficient evidence and in any event a party 
cannot invoke Article 51 after launching attacks outside the scope of self-defense. 
this by far remains one of the most influential decisions on the territorial integrity 
as pronounced by the court.
3. Democracy in Ukraine and Venezuela
3.1. Democracy in Ukraine
3.1.1. History of Ukraine
ukraine by virtue of its strategic location has always been the matrix of geopolitical 
interest and competition in eastern europe. Geographically speaking, it borders 
russia to east, Belarus to the North, Poland, slovakia and hungary jointly share its 
western borders and to the south lies romania, Moldova and the Black sea. since 
time immemorial, it has often played second fiddle to russia considering its long 
history as part of the russian empire and later the soviet union.104
3.1.2. Post-Soviet Era from 1992–2004
After the collapse of the soviet union, the supreme Council of the Communist 
Party of ukraine voted for independence which was affirmed by parliament in 1991.105 
this wind of political change was fermented by the promulgation of the independent 
Constitution in 1992. Chapter iv established the supreme Rada as the unicameral 
legislative organ alongside a split executive comprising of the Presidency and Prime 
Minister.106 Furthermore, Chapter v established the Office of the President as the 
Chief executive, head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the Military. Conversely, 
the Prime Minister being a presidential appointee was designated to supervise and 
coordinate government affairs.107 Furthermore, it provided for further checks and 
balances by establishing an independent judiciary together with a comprehensive 
104  Julia koch, The Efficacy and Impact of Interim Measures: Ukraine’s Inter-State Application Against Russia, 
39(1) Boston College international and Comparative Law review 163, 166 (2016).
105  Jordan Gans-Morse, Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions 
and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm, 20(4) Post-soviet Affairs 320 (2013).
106  Id.
107  Id. Ch. 6.
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VII (2019) Issue 4 52
Bill of rights.108 in light of this constitutional change, there was profound optimism 
the country would become the beacon of democracy, rule of law and human rights 
contrary to the dark past of communist authoritarianism.
however, this optimism for political change turned ominous after the country 
descended into a cycle of constitutional crises that pitted the presidency versus the 
parliament (Verkhovna Rada).109 in addition, there was regional competition that 
threated the political stability of the country. the western region is mostly dominated 
by ukrainians while the eastern region of Crimea and donbass comprises of ethnically 
russians.110 these cultural differences flared into separatist movement after Crimea 
threatened to secede but thereafter opted to remain after a referendum in 1992.
in 1996 the country passed constitutional amendment that granted the President 
the bulk of executive power to oversee the Premiership, Cabinet and regional governors 
(oblast). in the interest of maintaining relative checks and balances the legislature and 
judiciary maintained their independence. in 2000 then President Leonid kuchma 
sponsored a constitutional amendment to split the legislature into two chambers. 
despite the wide public support, the mission failed after the legislators opposed this 
change for fear it would neuter their powers to check the legislature.
3.1.3. The Era Orange Revolution and the Reign of Viktor Yushchenko
in 2005 President kuchma retired leaving behind a bitter and divisive electoral 
contest that pitted his two former Prime Ministers viktor yanukovych and viktor 
yushchenko. yanukovych the incumbent Premier was considered the anointed 
successor though moderate was perceived to lean towards the russian and widely 
popular in eastern regions of Crimea and donbass. On the other hand, yanukovych the 
perceived face of the opposition appeared more liberal and western leaning was the 
candidate of choice on western ukraine.111 in the first round of elections, yanukovych 
was declared the winner after garnering 51.4% of the votes against yushchenko’s 48%. 
this surprising electoral results triggered allegations of massive electoral fraud across 
the country considering the latter’s widespread popularity. in turn, this state of political 
disillusionment, triggered recurrent waves of protests and riots by pro-yushchenko 
supporters which were later dubbed the “Orange revolution.”112 Conversely, the voters 
108 Gans-Morse 2013, Chs. 8 and 2 respectively.
109  Matthew rojansky & Mykhailo Minakov, Kennan Cable No. 30: Democracy in Ukraine: Are We There 
Yet?, wilson Center, 30 January 2018 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
publication/kennan-cable-no-30-democracy-ukraine-are-we-there-yet.
110  Cory welt, Ukraine: Background and U.S. Policy, Congressional research service, 1 November 2017 
(Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=805685.
111  thomas sedelius & sten Berglund, Towards Presidential Rule in Ukraine: Hybrid Regime Dynamics Under 
Semi-Presidentialism, 5(1) Baltic Journal of Law and Politics 20, 30 (2012).
112  david Lane, The Orange Revolution: “People’s Revolution” or Revolutionary Coup?, 10(4) British Journal 
of Politics and international relations 525 (2008).
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in yanukovych’s native region of Crimea and donbass dismissed the allegations of 
electoral fraud citing his popularity.113 ultimately, yushchenko successfully challenged 
the results at the Constitutional Court and the electoral body held a re-run election 
which was easily won by yushchenko.
After his election President yushschenko appointed yulia tymoshenko as the 
Prime Minister. doubtless, tymoshenko was the undisputed rising star in the 
ukrainian politics considering her age and gender coupled with her unblemished 
political past. however, this political union turned acrimonious when yushschenko 
accused her of corruption and abuse of office after she oversaw the signing of the oil 
and gas deal with russia in 2009. in his view, tymoshenko was responsible for getting 
ukraine a raw deal after granting russian absolute control of the energy sector. this 
accusation and counteraccusation led to the ultimate dismissal, indictment and trial 
of tymoshenko for corruption and abuse of office. this indictment which was widely 
considered as a political mock trial especially after she had expressed her interest in 
contesting the presidency.114 in addition, she was the sacrificial lamb since europe 
had prevailed upon ukraine to enter into the agreement after russia had cut off gas 
supplies during the biting winter of January 2009.
in some sense, yushchenko and tymoshenko were at cross-purposes from the 
onset in terms of policy and political ideology. this inherent tension contributed 
to their ultimate failure to engineer serious radical change in governance.115 More 
specifically, yushchenko was a conservative who wanted to institute political change 
without changing the inherent face of the country. in contradiction, tymoshenko 
advocated for sweeping reforms committed to dismantling the oligarchy and the 
vicious cycle of corruption and cronyism. however, the constant infighting among 
the west leaning orange luminaries opened the loophole for the perennial dark horse 
viktor yanukovych to stage a political comeback and win the Presidential election in 
2010. As part of his political strategy, he managed to convince the supreme Court 
to reinstate considerable power in the presidency.116
3.1.4. Ukraine, Russia and the European Union Under the Reign of Viktor Yanukovych
in 2008 the eu promulgated the deep and Comprehensive Free trade Agreements 
(dCFtA) as platform to expand its membership to neighboring countries including 
113  Ararat Osipian & Alexandr Osipian, Why Donbass Votes for Yanukovych: Confronting the Ukrainian 
Orange Revolution, 14(4) demokratizatsiya: the Journal of Post-soviet democratization 495 (2006).
114  Oleksandr Zadorozhnii, Political Prosecutions in Ukraine: The Case of Yulia Tymoshenko, 45(2) hofstra 
Law review 479 (2016).
115  taras kuzio, Political Culture and Democracy: Ukraine as an Immobile State, 25(1) east european Politics 
and societies 88, 92 (2011).
116  taras kuzio, Viktor Yanukovych’s First 100 Days: Back to the Past, but What’s the Rush?, 18(3) demokratiza-
tsiya 208 (2010).
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ukraine. the eu was optimistic this treaty would spur economic growth by 
harmonizing the legal and economic framework across the region.117
this journey began after the Association Agreement (AA) which provided that ukraine 
should join the world trade Organization as a precursor to joining the dCFtA.118 however, 
President yanukovych elected to forestall the signing of the agreement pending further 
discussions with russia on the security and economic ties.119 this decision irked the 
europhile ukrainians who led protests known as the “euromaidan riots” that culminated 
into his downfall and subsequent exile to russia. After yanukovych was deposed the 
acting President Oleksandr turchynov signed the agreement into effect.120
Consequent to this political change, the eastern region of Crimea held a referendum 
that garnered 97% vote to join the russian Federation.121 this controversial move was 
widely criticized by western countries as an act of aggression and annexation of 
ukraine.122 however, a closer analysis of this scenario nullifies the brash generalizations 
and false moral equivalences besetting this matter. Just like kosovars, the Crimeans 
who are ethnically russians exercised their political right to self-determination and 
voted to join the russian Federation.123 in addition, this legality of this process was 
supported by the regional legislature of Crimea voted in favor of holding a referendum 
on this subject matter.124 that notwithstanding this issue remains one of the most 
controversial subjects in contemporary international law.125
3.1.5. Ukraine, Russia and NATO
similarly, ukraine is the locus of the new Cold war considering its proximity to 
russia and western europe. in hindsight, the end of the Cold war resulted in the 
117  Milan vošta et al., Ukraine-EU Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area as Part of Eastern Partnership 
Initiative, 9(3) Journal of international studies 21, 23 (2016).
118  Association Agreement between the european union and its Member states, of the one part, and 
ukraine, of the other part (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/
november/tradoc_155103.pdf.
119  derek Fraser, President Yanukovych’s Policies and Tendencies, Centre for Global studies, university of 
victoria (May 2010) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.uvic.ca/research/centres/globalstudies/
assets/docs/publications/President-yanukovych.pdf.
120  tuuli varsa, Ukraine and the European Union, 11 united europe 37 (2017).
121  koch 2016, at 171.
122  Oleksandr Merezhko, Crimea’s Annexation by Russia – Contradictions of the New Russian Doctrine of 
International Law, 75 Zaörv 167, 168 (2015).
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Russian Federation, 3(1) russian Law Journal 33, 35 (2015).
124  Juergen Bering, The Prohibition on Annexation: Lessons from Crimea, 49(3) New york university Journal 
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91(1) international Law studies 425, 446 (2015).
JOSEPH LUTTA 55
warm relationship between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris yeltsin.126 Nonetheless, 
this rapprochement began to deteriorate in 1999 after NAtO encroached into russian 
sphere of influence after engulfing Poland, hungary and Czech republic.127 in 2004 the 
second wave of admissions extended to the Baltic regions by granting membership to 
Lithuania, estonia, Latvia, slovenia, Bulgaria and romania much to the dissatisfaction 
of Moscow.
the 2008 summit in Bucharest, romania oversaw the passing of the resolution to 
admit Georgia and ukraine thereby extending NAtO’s footprint right outside russia’s 
doorstep.128 this precarious situation permeated into the domestic politics of ukraine 
that led to the ultimate division in 2014 after secession of Crimea. in spite of these 
challenges, NAtO remains adamant on its mission to protect weaker countries from 
the military threat from russian incursion. however, this objective is blotted with 
gross inaccuracies considering the fact that russia lacks the military and financial 
muscle to combat usA let alone NAtO.129 the latest statistics from the Peter G. Peterson 
Foundation indicates that in 2018 military spending by usA was a staggering $610 
billion compared to russia’s $55 billion.130 despite this glaring disparity, ukraine remains 
the centerpiece of the geopolitical contest between the two sides.
3.1.6. Legal Issues Surrounding the Ouster of Viktor Yanukovych
3.1.6.1. the unconstitutionality of the Ousting of President yanukovych
According to the Constitution of ukraine sovereign power vests upon the people 
of ukraine. this principle is enunciated in Article 46 which states that the expression 
of the will of the people is exercised through election, referendum and other forms of 
direct democracy. in terms of the presidency, Article 85 grants the Rada (legislature) 
the authority to determine the timelines of elections, institute impeachment 
proceedings in accordance with Article 111 and exercising parliamentary control 
within the limits of the Constitution.
Article 103 provides the President shall be elected by the people for a five year term 
on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.131 Furthermore, 
126  Padma desai, Russian Retrospectives on Reforms from Yeltsin to Putin, 19(1) Journal of economics 
Perspectives 87, 94 (2005).
127  Zoltan Barany, Stretching the Umbrella: NATO’s Eastern Expansion, 8(2) european view 231, 235 (2009).
128  John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, 
93(5) Foreign Affairs 1 (2014).
129  richard sokolsky, The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security, Carnegie 
endowment for international Peace, 13 March 2017 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://carnegieendowment.
org/2017/03/13/new-nato-russia-military-balance-implications-for-european-security-pub-68222.
130  the united states spends More on defense than the Next seven Countries Combined, Peter G. Peterson 
Foundation, 7 May 2018 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_ 
defense-comparison.
131  Constitution of ukraine, adopted at the Fifth session of the Verkhovna Rada of ukraine on 28 June 
1996 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ua/ua013en.pdf.
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Article 103(3) provides for a limit of two terms.132 Article 108 provides the outgoing 
President shall exercise power until the assumption of offices by the newly elected 
President.133 in addition, the presidential term may be terminated before completion 
on grounds of; resignation, incapacitation, impeachment and death.
under Article 109 the resignation shall enter into force once the President delivers 
his personal resignation speech upon meeting with the Rada.134 Article 111 outlines 
the procedure of impeaching the President on grounds of committing an offence or 
treason. the first step is whipping up majority support of at least 75% of the Rada.135 
thereafter, it will empanel a special temporary commission comprising of a special 
prosecutor and investigators to investigate the allegations against the President. upon 
completion of the investigation the commission will prepare and present a conclusive 
report at a meeting with the Rada. thereafter, the recommendations will only be 
adopted and implemented upon receiving at least two thirds of the Rada.
Consequently, if the Rada votes to impeach the President then said motion 
requires support of at least 75% of the constitutional membership to pass. Apart 
from this super majority vote, the motion will require the consideration and approval 
of the supreme Court. Finally Article 112 outlines if the presidency is prematurely 
terminated according to Articles 108, 109, 110 and 111 then the powers shall be 
temporarily exercised by the Prime Minister.136
Against the backdrop of the foregoing the legal provisions it is evident the ouster 
of President yanukovych was unconstitutional and a breach of the sovereign will of 
the ukrainian people. More specifically, Article 111 of the ukrainian Constitution 
stipulates that the motion to impeach should be supported by at least 75% of the 
members of the Rada.137 Nonetheless, the vote against yanukovych failed to satisfy 
this legal threshold since it was supported by 328 out of the 450 members which 
was representative of approximately 72%.
secondly, the motion was procedurally flawed since parliament never 
empanelled a special commission to investigate the whether his conduct breached 
the Constitution. thirdly, the process was mired with substantive irregularities 
since the motion was never subjected to the opinion of the Constitutional Court in 
accordance with Article 111 of the Constitution. Consequently, it fair to surmise the 
successive regime of President Oleksandr turchynov was illegal and illegitimate ab 
initio since it was composed in flippant disregard of the Constitution. in that regard, 
132 Constitution of ukraine, supra note 131.
133  Id.
134  Id.
135  Id.
136  Id.
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the regime lacked the legal mandate to negotiate on behalf of the ukrainian people. 
this concern resonates with the views of thomas who rightly argues legitimacy 
comprises of procedure, substance and outcomes.138
3.1.6.2. illegality of the Ousting of President yanukovych from Office
Firstly, the fact that Crimea in exercise of the right to self-determination voted to 
secede from ukraine indicates the interim government lacked the legitimate control 
of the whole country. More specifically, the legitimacy of any political regime can 
be classified into internal legitimacy and external legitimacy. internal legitimacy 
occurs when the subject recognizes the government while external legitimacy entails 
recognition by other states and international organizations.139 in hindsight, President 
yanukovych was duly recognized as the elected leader of ukraine by both the people 
and foreign states and organizations including the usA, russia and the european 
union. therefore, his removal should have conformed to the relevant provisions of 
the Constitution a fact which delegitimizes the successive government of President 
yushchenko and any subsequent agreement it purported to endorse on behalf of 
the ukrainian people. the long and short of this argument is that the validity of 
any international agreement is determined by the legitimacy of the government in 
question.140
in the same vein, it is imperative to appreciate the role and influence of the 
foreign elements in effecting the regime change in ukraine. this position is well 
enunciated by Matthew emery in his insightful paper “ukraine: Analyzing the 
revolution and NAtO Action in Light of the u.N. Charter and Nicaragua.” he notes 
the presence of NAtO troops and arming of ukraine against russia amounted to 
breach of sovereignty under public international law. More specifically, since ukraine 
is not a member of NAtO it was therefore erroneous to invoke collective defense 
under Article 5 of the Agreement.141 this legal dilemma fits neatly with the decision 
of Nicaragua v. USA since the NAtO exercised considerable control over the anti 
yanukovych factions hence it should have foreseen the possible consequences of 
its actions in using force to depose a duly elected president.
secondly, in the Nicaragua decision the usA was assailed for attempting to bring 
down the legitimate government led by the sandinistas. therefore, if one adopts this 
138  C.A. thomas, The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law, Lse Law, society and economy working 
Papers 12/2013 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51746/1/__libfile_repository_Content_
Law%2C%20society%20and%20economics%20working%20papers_2013_wPs2013-12_thomas.pdf.
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Fordham international Law Journal 223 (1980–81).
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legal reasoning and argues inversely it would be illegal to funnel military support to 
prop up and defend an illegitimate government. within the context of ukraine, the 
interim government of President Oleksandr turchynov was downright illegitimate for 
failing to satisfy the prescribed constitutional threshold. Nonetheless, NAtO offered 
military support to this illegitimate government as a defensive measure against the 
resurgence of the President yanukovych and the russian support. it is therefore fair 
to argue NAtO’s activities in ukraine violated Article 2(4) and 51 of the u.N. Charter 
together with the relevant principles of customary law including the holding of 
Nicaragua decision.
thirdly, the decision of DRC v. Uganda is applicable in this case since the NAtO 
support for the anti-yanukovych forces amounted to belligerent occupation. this is 
because NAtO failed to secure the official invitation from the President yanukovych 
who was the legitimate leader of the ukraine.
Admittedly, this argument is overtaken by events considering the political 
developments that led to the election of the comedian volodymyr Zelensky as 
President. Nonetheless, considering the long term implications of these actions on 
the rule of law and sovereignty of ukraine, it is prudent to address this concern to 
avoid similar trend in future.
3.2. Venezuela
3.2.1. Background Study
the political dynamics of venezuela have often been defined by class disparity 
between the elites and massive poor. this deplorable situation was exacerbated after 
the spanish conquest which resulted in the disproportionate allocation of wealth 
in favor of affluent landowners while marginalizing the majority native population. 
however, the oil boom in the mid-20th century triggered a diametrical shift in the 
political power which fell in the hands of the urban bourgeoisie.142
Apart from class, the dynamics of politics in venezuela is defined by race which 
remains a thorny and volatile issue in the social fabric. in essence, the spanish elites 
have always dominated the politics much to the detriment and expense of the 
Afro-venezuelans and the indigenous groups.143 thirdly, just like any oil dependent 
global south country venezuela is beset with corruption, cronyism, socio-economic 
inequality and shrinking democratic space.144
By and large, venezuela’s transition to democracy began in 1958 after the overthrow 
of the brutal regime of Marcos Pérez Jiménez.145 this political change resulted in 
142  terry L. karl, Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, 23(1) Comparative Politics 1 (1990).
143  Jesús M. herrera salas, Ethnicity and Revolution: The Political Economy of Racism in Venezuela, 32(2) 
Latin American Perspectives 72, 76 (2005).
144  trudie O. Coker, Globalization and State Capital Accumulation: Deteriorating Economic and Political 
Rights in Venezuela, 26(5) Latin American Perspectives 75, 82 (1999).
145  George w. schuyler, Perspectives on Venezuelan Democracy, 23(3) Latin American Perspectives 10 (1996).
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a fragile democracy that was susceptible to foreign interest due to the lucrative oil 
reserves. Most importantly, the iMF and western nations prevailed upon the country 
to implement neo-liberal policies that left the masses disgruntled and disenfranchised 
by their political elites. this political turmoil climaxed in the last quarter of the century 
during the regimes of Carlos Andrés Pérez, ramón José velásquez and rafael Caldera 
whose aggressive policies of privatization triggered the emergence of populism and 
socialist movements.146
3.2.2. The Rise of Hugo Chávez and Bolivarianism
hugo rafael Chávez a decorated and charismatic military leader was elected the 
President in 1998. this was his maiden attempt at competitive politics after being 
released from prison for leading a failed coup against the unpopular government of 
western leaning President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992.147 President Pérez implemented 
aggressive neo-liberal policies resulted in the reduced the oil revenues after the 
government reduced its stake in the industry.148 As part of his political change President 
Chávez promulgated a new constitution in 1999 christened the Bolivarian Constitution. 
this legal document was an admixture of pluralist and participatory policies that sort 
to accelerate grassroots participation in the electoral process.149
in essence, Chávez strategically rebranded himself as modern day simón Bolívar 
seeking to emancipate the country from the control of the elites who were out of 
touch with the masses.150 he appealed to his signature red beret, machismo image and 
eloquence to champion a novel political ideology that fused together socialism and 
populism that was later christened “Bolivarianism.” According to víctor Figueroa the 
principal hallmarks of Bolivarian system of government are recovery and expansion of 
the state’s ability to intervene in the economic process, increasing the standard of living 
of the popular sectors and a radical transformation of the political regime.151
in terms of socio-economic program he diverted significant proportions of the 
oil revenue into social welfare program such as health care, education, housing and 
public infrastructure that benefited the masses. Moreover, in 2006 he sponsored the 
passing of the Communal Council Law which incorporated the community groups in 
146  Antonio velasco Castro, Privatization and Democracy in Venezuela, 32(3) Latin American Perspectives 
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the economic planning process.152 this change was followed by the Law of Contract, 
2009 which encouraged private sector investment with a proviso that 3% of their 
profits be directed to social responsibility.153 this populist economic policy bolstered 
his political clout among the majority poor who had borne the brunt of the neo-liberal 
policies as implemented by his predecessors.154 this grassroots approach transformed 
his Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) party into a political juggernaut that 
steamrolled its way into three successive electoral victories.
in terms of foreign policy, he used the lucrative income from the oil windfall 
to make political in-roads across Latin America by championing against anti-
Americanism.155 he also forged close ties with Cuban patriarch Fidel Castro in a bid 
to combat American influence in the region. From the outset, this political ideology 
did not sit well with washington which engaged in a program known as “democracy 
Promotion” in venezuela. this campaign witnessed the Bush government funneling 
funds to opposition movements through the National endowment for democracy 
(Ned). On his part, President Chávez read mischief arguing it was strategic plan to 
institute regime change.156 this apprehension hit a peak in April 2002 after a failed 
coup that was led by Pedro Carmona the de facto leader of the venezuelan Federation 
of Chambers of Commerce and Production (Fedecámaras). this political turbulence 
poisoned the already frosty relationship between the two leaders prompting President 
Chávez to hit back at President Bush by branding him an imperialist.157 this prompted 
him to counter the American influence by cementing his foreign relationship with 
other global powers such russia, China, turkey, iran, iraq and Libya.
3.2.3. The Reign of Nicolás Maduro Regime
On 5 April 2011 President Chávez died in Caracas while undergoing treatment 
for cancer thereby paving the way for his loyal deputy Nicolás Maduro. upon 
assuming office the mustachioed former bus driver promised to carry the mantle 
of Bolivarianism and follow the footsteps of his predecessor. he won the elections in 
2011 but with a narrower margin compared to his more charismatic and charming 
152  Matt wilde, Contested Spaces: The Communal Councils and Participatory Democracy in Chávez’s 
Venezuela, 44(1) Latin American Perspectives 140, 145 (2017).
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predecessor. however, his regime was beset with a series u.s. led economic sanctions 
coupled with dwindling oil prices that resulted in high inflation rates and rapid 
economic downturn. this precarious economic situation resulted in acute shortage 
of basic necessities and humanitarian crisis that triggered mass emigration into 
neighboring Brazil and Colombia.
Nonetheless, the peak of his political nightmare began in January 2019. Juan 
Gerardo Guaidó Márquez, the President of National Assembly swore himself as the 
President of venezuela. he argued the Maduro presidency was illegitimate and 
invoked Article 233 of the Constitution which allows the National Assembly to replace 
a sitting President.158 this political change triggered a political earthquake that ripped 
the country right in the middle with the corporate elite supporting the change while 
large swathes of the military officials remained loyal to the regime. On one hand, the 
western countries recognized Guaidó while Maduro enjoyed the support of russia, 
China, Cuba, Nicaragua, iran and syria. however, this change turned unsuccessful 
after Guaidó failed to secure the support of the military and the masses.
3.2.4. Neoconservatism
According to Justin vaïsse this political ideology stands on five pillars: interna-
tionalism, primacy, unilateralism, militarism and democracy.159 it gained currency 
during the era of President ronald reagan who offered military support to various 
anti-communist movements across the globe.160 however, this movement hit a peak 
during the Presidency of George w. Bush (45) after the terrorist attacks of september 
2001. this callous attack on innocent civilians led to the paradigmatic shift in American 
policy which sought to neutralize states perceived to harbor, incubate and sympathize 
with terrorist groups.161 the point of origin in realizing this objective was Operation 
endure Freedom (OeF) which sought to destroy the taliban regime that was suspected 
of protecting Al-Qaeda inside the rugged terrains of Afghanistan.162 Nonetheless, this 
mission was unsuccessful from inception due to absolute misunderstanding of the 
political terrains.163
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in spite of this abysmal failure, President Bush spearheaded this campaign by 
branding iraq, iran and North koreas “the axis of evil” that threatened the world.164 
this precarious foreign policy precipitated the confrontation with President saddam 
hussein of iraq had breached u.N. resolution 687 of 1991 by of enriching stockpiles.165 
despite the glaring opposition and lack of legal foundation President Bush and 
British Prime Minister tony Blair led the invasion of iraq in order to disarm saddam 
hussein.166 however, this quixotic mission turned ominous after iraq disintegrated 
into a dystopia of sectarian violence and terrorist insurgency that ushered in the 
infamous islamic state.167
the unpopular war coupled with the economic downturn blemished the 
republican Party resulting in the landslide electoral victory of President Barrack 
Obama opened a new window of opportunity to undo the geopolitical damage 
caused by the Neoconservatism of the Bush regime.168 however, this political change 
was a mere cosmetic facelift after President Obama and hilary Clinton agitated for 
the ultimate airstrike against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi under the guise of averting 
the dire humanitarian situation in the Libya.169 Just like iraq this humanitarian 
mission morphed into failed regime change after Libya became a safe haven of isis 
sympathizers, human traffickers and slave and organ traders.170
3.2.5. Enter President Donald Trump a Political Dark Horse or Trojan Horse for 
Neoconservatism?
President donald trump remains one of the enigmatic and controversial figures 
in the global politics history. despite being the proverbial dark horse and political 
novice, the flashy business mogul cum reality television star pulled a historical 
electoral upset after defeating hilary Clinton for the u.s. Presidency. in essence, 
trump campaigned using the slogans of “America First” and “Make America Great 
Again” where nationalism would subsume globalism as the ideological hallmark.171 
164  ronli sifris, Operation Iraqi Freedom: United States v. Iraq – the Legality of the War, 4(2) Melbourne 
Journal of international Law 521 (2003).
165  u.N. security Council, resolution 687 (1991), 3 April 1991, s/res/687.
166  Anthony Carty, The Iraq Invasion as a Recent United Kingdom “Contribution to International Law,” 16(1) 
european Journal of international Law 143, 144 (2005).
167  Charles tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided Unilateralism as a Paradigm of 
Foreign War, 29(1) university of Pennsylvania Journal of international Law 1, 2 (2007).
168  Chengxin Pan & Oliver turner, Neoconservatism as Discourse: Virtue, Power and US Foreign Policy, 23(1) 
european Journal of international relations 74, 75 (2017).
169  Nicolò Cantini & dmitry Zavialov, Fixing Responsibility to Protect: Lessons from and Proposals for the 
Case of Libya, 2(1) Peace human rights Governance 75, 81 (2018).
170  spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria, 13(1) Melbourne Journal of interna-
tional Law 59 (2013).
171  James Curran, “Americanism, Not Globalism”: President Trump and the American Mission, Lowy institute, 
2 July 2018 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/americanism-
not-globalism-president-trump-and-american-mission-0.
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during the course of his campaign, he promised to end the pointless wars that nearly 
bankrupted the country. this drastic change in foreign and economic policy signified 
a major shift in the republican Party whose foreign policy stood on neoconservatism 
and regime change.
indeed, President trump temporarily fulfilled his promised to pacifist ambitions 
after reaching out to russia and North korea. it was therefore expected that his 
administration would extend the same courtesy to venezuela which despite being 
one of the strongest russian ally in the region posed no military threat to the united 
states.
At first there was uneasy silence from the administration which turned catastrophic 
after a Cabinet reshuffle that resulted in the infiltration of the neoconservatism in the 
regime. Firstly, the secretary of state rex tillerson was replaced by Central intelligence 
Agency (CiA) Michael Pompeo. this signified a sudden change since tillerson a former 
oilman from the energy conglomerate exxon Mobil was pacifist compared to Pompeo 
a neoconservative who has made repeated calls for regime changes in iran and 
venezuela. More specifically, he supported the unconstitutional, illegitimate and 
unilateral “presidency” of Juan Guaidó and called for President Maduro to immediately 
relinquish power with immediate effect to allow free and fair elections.172
Along a similar vein, John Bolton replaced General h.r. McMaster as the National 
security Advisor in April 2018. this appointment was instrumental in poisoning 
the already strained relationship between the u.s. and venezuela. Bolton, a hard-
hitting, iron fisted and unapologetic neoconservative whom President trump has 
described as his “hawk” horned his political skills at the Pentagon during the regime 
of President George w. Bush. in 2000 while a senior policy advisor at the right wing 
think tank American enterprise institute (Aei) he published a paper lamenting the 
influence of globalism on America’s legitimate right to use force.173
he bemoaned the rise of global legal framework such as the u.N. Charter, rome 
statute and international Landmine Convention interfered with America’s duty as 
the watchdog for global security.174 in another paper he argued against international 
and customary international law as a source of law in strict sense.175 he adopted the 
John Austin positivist school of thought by arguing international law is not a source 
of law due to lack a formal and recognized enforcement authority. this publication 
was a clear indication of his downright revulsion towards the global legal framework 
on sovereignty and use of force.
172  secretary Pompeo urges Nicolás Maduro to Leave venezuela, Fox News, 1 May 2019 (Oct. 30, 2019), 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osi1XX9uzru&t=31s.
173  John r. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1(2) Chicago Journal of international 
Law 205 (2000).
174  Id. at 210.
175  John r. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 
64(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 167, 171 (2001).
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during this tenure he formed the matrix of political power in Bush regime by 
joining forces with dick Cheney, donald rumsfeld and Paul wolfowitz as the chief 
architects of National Security Strategy of the United States in september 2002.176 
this controversial document became the holy grail of 21st century neoconservatism 
by advocating for preemptive use of force, spreading of freedom and democracy 
across the globe.177 however, after the failed regime changes in iraq and Afghanistan, 
Bolton became unpopular in the democrat controlled congress which shot down 
his nomination as the u.N. Ambassador. he then returned to the private sector as 
consultant to various conservative groups.
No sooner had Bolton been appointed by President trump than he began venting 
his revulsion towards the leftist regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua and venezuela by branding 
them the “troika of tyranny” that sought to resuscitate the ghost of communism in 
Latin America.178 during an interview with Fox News the mask slipped after Bolton 
singled out the Bolivarian regime as threat to American oil interest in the region. he 
further admitted the u.s. government was engaging various oil companies intending 
to invest in venezuela under the new regime. these companies included the energy 
conglomerate CitGO which has considerable investments in the venezuela.179 this 
chilling admission cast serious aspersion on the goodwill and necessity of American 
intervention in venezuela.
this volatile situation was further aggravated by President trump who in sudden 
and absolute departure from his pacifist and nationalist ideology admitted the use 
of force against venezuela was still an option. this remark triggered a ripple effect 
across the region reminiscent of the invasions of reagan administration invasion of 
Nicaragua, Grenada and el salvador.180
3.2.6. Determining the Legitimacy of the Juan Guaidó Regime Change
in determining the legitimacy of Juan Guaidó Presidency, one requires a holistic and 
comprehensive understanding of the Constitution of venezuela. Article 141 stipulates 
the principles of public administration as honesty, participation, expeditiousness, 
176  the National security strategy, the white house (september 2002) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.
177  emily haslam & wade Mansell, John Bolton and the United States’ Retreat from International Law, 14(4) 
social and Legal studies 459, 464 (2005).
178  Josh rogin, Bolton Promises to Confront Latin America’s “Troika of Tyranny,” washington Post, 1 Novem-
ber 2018 (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/
bolton-promises-to-confront-latin-americas-troika-of-tyranny/2018/11/01/df57d3d2-ddf5-11e8-
85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html.
179  John Bolton: i don’t think Maduro has the Military on his side, Fox News, 25 January 2019 (Oct. 30, 
2019), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8av-cPP1uPe&t=66s.
180  Peter s. Michaels, Lawless Intervention: United States Foreign Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 7(2) 
Boston College third world Law Journal 223 (1987).
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efficacy, efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsibility.181 this section 
underscores the importance of political leaders exercising public power for the 
ultimate benefit of the people. Nonetheless, the fact that western countries were 
eager to support the regime fails to confirm the public support required as stipulated 
by the Constitution.
this concern is anchored on Article 152 of the Constitution which states that end 
objectives of international relations shall be to the benefit and interest of the people.182 
this clause nullifies the American intervention after John Bolton admitted they had 
vested and strategic interest in the oil sector. Most importantly, Article 228 states 
that election of the president shall be universal suffrage by direct and secret ballot in 
accordance with the law. this significant clause delegitimizes the purported Presidency 
of Guaidó who was never elected into office by the people of venezuela.
Admittedly, Article 233 grants the National Assembly the power to replace a sitting 
president.183 however, that clause does not operate in isolation since it is subject to other 
provisions. Firstly, Article 254 establishes the supreme tribunal of Justice (stJ) as the 
highest judicial organ in the country. this body comprises of the most eminent jurists 
with at least fifteen years of professional experience.184 Article 262 as read together 
with Article 266 of the Constitution grants the stJ the power to determine whether the 
President should replace by the President of National Assembly.185 Most importantly, 
Article 138 of the Constitution states that any authority that is usurped authority is 
ineffective, null and void. Finally, Article 139 states that misuse of public power or 
misapplication of power or violation of Constitution gives rise to individual liability.186
3.2.7. Legal Issues on American Intervention in Venezuela
3.2.7.1. Lack of Justification Based on humanitarian Concerns
From the outset this paper argues in principle that any form of u.s. intervention 
in venezuela whether militarily or politically is illegal and unwarranted. As Barry 
Benjamin points out the framers of the u.N. Charter proscribed the humanitarian 
intervention to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member 
states.187 even though the interpretation of the Charter of has since evolved to befit 
the changing circumstances the same cannot apply to the context of venezuela.
181  venezuela (Bolivarian republic of )’s Constitution of 1999 with Amendments through 2009 (Oct. 30, 
2019), available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/venezuela_2009.pdf?lang=en.
182  Id.
183  Id.
184  Id.
185  Id.
186  Id.
187  Barry M. Benjamin, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human 
Rights Atrocities, 16(1) Fordham international Law Journal 120, 136 (1992).
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Firstly, there is no scintilla of evidence that the Maduro government is responsible 
for gross violation of human rights against the civilians. in that regard, the 
controversial defense of controversial justification of humanitarian intervention does 
not suffice. secondly, the American government has not followed the due process 
of procuring the resolution from the security Council that would warrant any form 
of humanitarian intervention in venezuela.188 Nonetheless, it is clear the American 
mission is purely a matter of promoting its national interest across Latin America 
rather than ensuring humanitarian welfare and geopolitical stability.
3.2.7.2. Lack of Justification for Attacking venezuela on Grounds of self-defense
in line with the express provisions of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the u.N. Charter and 
relevant principles of customary international law self-defense is a viable reason to 
use force against armed attack against a hostile state.189 in the Nicaragua case the 
iCJ defined as an armed attack:
it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood 
as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international 
border, but also “the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
state of such gravity as to amount to” … an actual armed attack conducted 
by regular forces, “or its substantial involvement therein.”190
however, it is axiomatic that venezuela does not pose any threat of armed attack 
against the united states of America. therefore, there is no justification for armed 
attack against the regime of Nicolás Maduro.
secondly, in the Oil Platforms case the iCJ was categorical that the law presumes 
an armed attack against the party responding in self-defense.191 it then follows suit 
that the party which launches an armed attack on grounds of self-defense bears 
the burden of proving it is an actual victim responding to armed attack from hostile 
parties.192 however, a critical analysis of this indicates the united states has failed to 
demonstrate any element of military threat from venezuela that would warrant the 
188  Chelsea O’donnell, The Development of the Responsibility to Protect: An Examination of the Debate 
over the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 24(3) duke Journal of Comparative and international 
Law 557, 558 (2014).
189  Müge kinacioğlu, The Principle of Non-Intervention at the United Nations: The Charter Framework 
and the Legal Debate, Perceptions (summer 2005) (Oct. 30, 2019), available at https://sam.gov.tr/
wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Muge-kinacioglu.pdf.
190  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 84, para. 195.
191  Case Concerning Oil Platforms, supra note 96.
192  rebaz khdir, The Right to Self-Defence in International Law as a Justification for Crossing Borders: The 
Turkey-PKK Case within the Borders of Iraq, 4(4) russian Law Journal 62, 66 (2016).
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military response. in light of this legal position, it is fair to surmise the u.s. is prohibited 
from attacking venezuela under the pretext of exercising the right to self-defense.
3.2.7.3. intermeddling with the sovereignty of venezuela and the doctrine of 
vicarious Liability
it is a trite fact that any form of political change should conform to the provisions 
of the Constitution as the supreme body of law. According to hans kelsen the 
Constitution is the symbol of the grundnorm which lies at the apex of the legal 
system hence giving validity to other legal norms.193 this legal arrangement is what 
maintains the rule of law and prevents any society from descending into anarchy.194 
similar strands of thought apply to venezuela which stands on the verge of a serious 
constitutional crisis.
Firstly, the act of Juan Guaidó swearing himself as the President of venezuela 
was declared illegal by the supreme tribunal of Justice (stJ) in accordance with 
Article 266 of the Constitution.195 the net effect of this declaration is that Nicolás 
Maduro remains the bona fide President of venezuela. in spite of this position, the 
western countries and Brazil have remained steadfast in recognizing and supporting 
the Guaidó in order to undermine the Maduro regime.
however, this policy is illegal and contravenes the rules of customary international 
law in terms of respecting the sovereignty and domestic laws of individual 
countries.196 More specifically, Articles 1 and 2 of the declaration of Friendly Nations 
which prohibits states from interfering with the internal affairs of other countries.197 
this inaction by the western countries holds them vicariously liable for the actions 
of Guaidó and his supporters who are their agents in venezuela so to speak.
similarly, if one extrapolates the holding of the Nicaragua case within the 
context of civil strife and intermeddling, it is evident that the united states played 
a critical role in the rise of Juan Guaidó. One way or another Guaidó is the “civilian 
version” of the contras since he operates under the ostensible control and support 
of the American government. therefore, one is able to establish a credible chain of 
command between washington and the chaos and anarchy that is occasioned by 
Guaidó and his supporters in Caracas.
in the same vein the holding of the iCJ in the Hostages case in tandem with the 
doctrine of vicarious liability is equally applicable to this context. in that case it was 
193  Michael s. Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54(2) Alabama Law review 365, 376 (2003).
194  ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the European Union 
and the United States, 72(2) university of Pittsburgh Law review 229, 231 (2010).
195  Id.
196  Fulvio M. Palombino, Compliance with International Judgments: Between Supremacy of International 
Law and National Fundamental Principles, 75 Zaörv 503, 504 (2015).
197  Id.
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evident Ayatollah khomeini was the ultimate controlling authority of the students 
prior and after they seized control of the embassy in tehran. in addition, he was 
bound to benefit from their actions by invigorating the atmosphere of the revolution 
against the usA. however, the mere fact that he failed to restrain their actions was 
reason enough for iran to be held culpable for their actions.
the same case applies to the nexus between usA and Juan Guaidó in venezuela. 
in essence, his presidency was nullified by the supreme tribunal of Justice in line 
with Article 266(2) of the Constitution. in spite of this nullification, the west and Brazil 
breathed life into this illegality by continuing to recognize and support Guaidó and 
his supporters who continue to destabilize across the country. therefore, it is cogent 
to argue the west is vicariously liable under international law for the damage and 
chaos occasioned by Guaidó and his supporters in the country.
3.2.7.4. the Legitimacy of the Presidency of Nicolás Maduro from the international 
Perspective
By and large, the international community is torn apart on the legitimacy between 
the Maduro and Guaidó regimes. the most viable option in resolving this quandary 
is invoking the relevant provisions of domestic law. this is because the Constitutional 
being the supreme law of the land is what prevents society from descending into 
chaos and anarchy.198 First and foremost, Article 228 of the venezuelan Constitution 
stipulates the President shall be elected by universal suffrage directly by the people 
and secret ballot.199 unlike Nicolás Maduro, Juan Guaidó election was never elected 
by the people, if anything, he swore himself into office under the blessings of western 
countries and Brazil. in addition, his interim Presidency was later nullified by the 
supreme Council of Justice (sCJ) in line with Article 266(2) of the Constitution. in 
effect, this decision delegitimized his actions thereby reverting back to the previous 
status quo with Nicolás Maduro as the President.
in light of this legal position one may argue the Maduro presidency commensurates 
with the prevailing constitutional order and the rule of law. this is because the 
Constitution being the supreme law grants validity to the political authority.200 
Furthermore, one of the hallmarks of liberal democracy is the ability of the people to 
make their political decisions and not being imposed by external sources.201 therefore, 
it is self-evident the west and Brazil are violating the rights of the venezuelan people 
by superimposing Juan Guaidó presidency upon them.
198  Michel rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74(5) southern 
California Law review 1307 (2001).
199  Id.
200  Larry C. Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power 
Systems, 113(3) Penn state Law review 671, 676 (2009).
201  sveinung Arnesen, Legitimacy from Decision-Making Influence and Outcome Favourability: Results from 
General Population Survey Experiments, 65(1s) Political studies 146, 148 (2017).
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3.2.7.5. violation of the Permanent sovereignty over Natural resources of vene-
zuelan People
the principle of permanent sovereignty natural resources is instrumental in 
granting countries especially those in the right global south to control their resources.202 
in hindsight, John Bolton was emphatic in admitting the American government was 
reaching out to various corporations such as CitGO intending to invest in the lucrative 
venezuelan energy sector. this chilling admission confirms any form of American 
intervention in venezuela would amount to gross and egregious violation of the socio-
economic rights of the venezuelan people.203 More specifically, the iCCPr, iCesCr 
and rio Convention recognize this intrinsic right of the venezuelan people to control 
their resources.204 however, if the regime change substitutes the oil interest in favor 
foreign corporations and not the venezuelan people amounts to violation of the right 
to control natural resources.
Conclusion
the situation in venezuela and ukraine is emblematic of President eisenhower’s 
warning how the Military-industrial Complex poses an existential threat on global 
stability and the international rule of law. this precarious situation is exacerbated 
by the fact that black letter law and customary international law are blotted with 
loopholes on the justification of the use of force. it is therefore imperative for all 
the relevant material stakeholders to revisit and rectify this situation. secondly, 
it is judicious to argue the governments of President yanukovych in ukraine and 
President Maduro in venezuela were fraught with various shortcomings ranging 
from corruption, cronyism and repression of political dissidents. Nonetheless, 
this democratic concern does not justify any form of foreign intervention under 
the guise of promoting democracy and regime change. if anything, it is the duty 
and right of the people to replace these governments from power in line with the 
relevant provisions of their respective Constitutions. in the light of the foregoing it 
is instrumental for the united Nations to revisit the declaration of Friendly Nations 
and upgrade its status from soft law into hard law convention in order to protect 
the integrity and sovereignty of the weaker and smaller states from illegal foreign 
intervention. Finally, it would be prudent to put in place drastic criminal sanctions 
202  yolanda t. Chekera & vincent O. Nmehielle, The International Law Principle of Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources as an Instrument for Development: The Case of Zimbabwean Diamonds, 6(1) 
African Journal of Legal studies 69, 77 (2013).
203  Nicolaas schrijver, Self-Determination of Peoples and Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources 
in Realizing the Right to Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Right to Development 95 (New york; Geneva: united Nations, 2013).
204  hans Morten haugen, The Right to Self-Determination and Natural Resources: The Case of Western 
Sahara, 3(1) Law, environment and development Journal 70, 73 (2007).
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against nation states that illegally invoke the use of force in international law. this 
measure would be instrumental in safeguarding the international rule of law by 
protecting the smaller countries in global south and eastern europe from the 
needless attacks from powerful states.
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